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Abstract 
This discussion paper looks at the connections between economies and ecosystems, or more 
generally biophysical reality.  The term ‘economies’ is used, rather than ‘the economy’, 
because of the prevalent false claim that there is only one type of economic system that is 
possible.  We outline how the ecological crises is linked to the dominant drive for economic 
growth and the tendency to equate growth with progress and development; common even 
amongst those apparently critical of the need for continued growth in the materially rich 
countries.  The unreality of mainstream economics is epitomised by the accolades given to 
those justifying mild reformist policy in response to human induced climate change in order 
to continue the pursuit of economic growth.  We emphasise the structural aspects of 
economies as emergent from and dependent upon the structure and functioning of both society 
and ecology (energy and material flows).  Finally, that the structure of the global economy 
must change to avoid social ecological collapse, poses the questions of how that can be 
achieved and what sort of economics is necessary?  We explain the need for: (i) a structural 
change that addresses the currently dysfunctional relationships between economic, social and 
ecological systems, and (ii) an economics that is interdisciplinary and realist about its social 
and natural science relations. 
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1A version of this discussion paper will appear in the Real World Economics Review. 
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I. Introduction 
The state of planet Earth is widely recognised as in jeopardy due to a range of environmental 
problems relating to a dominant economic system that extracts resources and uses energy on 
an unprecedented scale in human history. A long-running claim amongst mainstream 
economists, defenders of unregulated capitalism and those favouring a regulated productivist 
economy has been that human ingenuity can find substitutes for all resources and technology 
can solve all problems allowing humanity to change and adapt to anything. These arguments 
are made in almost total ignorance of how the economy interacts with ecosystems and impacts 
their structure and functioning, how dependent economies are on the flow of low entropy 
materials and energy and what are the basic limits to humans as biological animals. Indeed 
even ignorance itself is ignored and reduced down to risk and probabilities. 
Yet, that economies must change is no longer in question. That they will change is also 
no longer even an issue. The question is what responses materialise as resources, energy 
supplies and functioning of ecosystems do change? The options being put forward are 
numerous, but most aim to preserve some form of high-technology, capital accumulating, 
growth economy embedded in price-making markets, including: green economy, climate 
economy, low carbon economy, circular economy, knowledge economy, bioeconomy. Yet, 
none of these addresses the causal mechanisms of the current crises, or structural issues facing 
social ecological transformation; they are concerned only with controlling for impacts and 
adapting to consequences, not with the bio-physical relations of the economy with non-human 
nature. 
This article provides an overview of the relationships between economic systems and 
the environment, human society and non-human nature, ecology and economy. It brings 
together various literatures with the aim of introducing the reader to the importance of 
biophysical reality for the operation of real economies, and therefore also for economics. In 
the next section, we explain the problems facing standard economic approaches if they are to 
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address environmental problems, but more generally their inability to even understand the 
social ecological crises due to a limited scope and direction. This is followed by outlining the 
place of economies in the context of their social and bio-physical structural relations, a basic 
general ontology. More specific detail is then added on the lessons that can be drawn from 
ecological understanding in terms of ecosystems, materials and energy. The final section 
draws out the implications of this understanding for social ecological transformation of the 
currently dominant economic systems and the type of economics required to help achieve that 
transformation. 
 
II. What ails economics? Growth, development and the environment 
Economists hold that their concern is an object of study called “the economy”. An object most 
economists assume can be treated meaningfully without any consideration of the social 
ecological context in which it operates, the society from which it emerges or the biophysical 
reality on which it depends. This positon is challenged by the, now common, realisation that 
there are serious environmental problems looming, including: mass extinction of species, 
biodiversity loss, destruction of ecosystems structure and functioning, and pollution of land, 
air and water on all scales from local to global. Talk of limits to economic growth by 
Meadows et al. (1972) was denigrated by economists (e.g., Beckerman 1974), but 
unfortunately their baseline scenario analysis has proven in line with real trends (Turner 
2012). Limits have now returned to the political agenda, conceptualised as planetary 
boundaries (Rockström, et al. 2009). 
However, few economists pay any attention to the ultimate failure of economic growth 
as their guiding principle. Even those, like Tim Jackson, who do claim prosperity is possible 
without growth still defend the need for economic growth for “poorer countries”. As Jackson 
(2009: 41) makes clear, a “key message” of his book on the topic is that: “There is no case to 
abandon growth universally. […] It is in these poorer countries that growth really does make a 
4 
 
difference”. This positon totally conflicts with the post-development school that documents 
how equating development with growth has been an imperialist post-World War II policy 
promoted by the USA and implemented through various captured organisations, such as the 
IMF and the World Bank (Sachs 2015 [1999]). Development policy has denigrated and 
destroyed the cultures of non-industrialised countries, livelihoods of the rural and materially 
poor and removed their autonomy. Sachs differentiates the materially poor into what can be 
described as living frugally, suffering deprivation and living under systems of economic 
scarcity. Traditional societies have economic systems of social provisioning that are 
structured on frugality and sufficiency. Interventions to “develop” their economic 
circumstances have typically resulted in expropriation and forms of primitive accumulation. 
Culture is destroyed along with sustainable livelihoods. Land is grabbed, resources exploited, 
agriculture is industrialised and the environment is polluted. The survivors add to the 
exponential growth in urban slum dwellers, more than a billion on conservative UN estimates 
a decade ago (Davis 2006: 23). A class of people ready for exploitation as commodified 
labour due to their newly-created wage dependency and their new lives as those saved from 
“poverty” to live in the economy of material scarcity measured by money. 
Economists have continued to promote the “growth=development” ideology of progress 
even as the consequences (e.g., human induced climate change and biodiversity loss) are 
realised to be increasingly severe and threatening to all. The standard economic response has 
been to extend markets and private property rights including attempts to make ecosystems 
into goods and services (Spash 2015) and greenhouse gases into financially tradeable 
commodities (Spash 2010). Economic growth has remained the primary concern, with 
environmental issues considered only if investments give a positive financial rate of return, 
economic growth and jobs (GCEC 2014; Jaeger, et al. 2011). The problem is not seen as 
ecological crises, but how business can realise and capture the economic value that 
ecosystems produce. The opportunities for profiting from environmental problems are a 
5 
 
stimulating tonic for creators of new markets and financial instruments that “make Nature 
pay”. 
Despite their ever increasing type, number and scale, environmental problems are 
treated by most economists as isolated, individual instances of market failure. Their 
conceptualisation as “externalities” has been copied widely. The classic treatment, as in Coase 
and neoclassical environmental economics, is based on pollution being a minor problem 
between two contracting parties operating in an isolated system with no irreversibility, 
uncertainty, indeterminacy, unknowns, complexity or asymmetric information. Much is made 
of relaxing assumptions to take account of some of these things (one at a time ceteris 
paribus), but the basic “solutions” – unregulated markets and private property rights – remain, 
regardless of whether the simplest or most complex models are applied. This is a closed, self-
referencing system of deductive thought. In short, it is a total fiction that bears no relationship 
to actual environmental problems operating in a complex open systems reality, and as a result 
it produces policies that fail. Neither is any attempt being made to identify real causal 
mechanisms. However, ideas have the power to motivate people and externality theory serves 
as a convenient fiction, suited to maintain economic theories of efficiency, the neoliberal 
ideology of “free” markets, and the supreme economic objective of technologically driven 
growth. 
In reality, the creation of environmental degradation is nothing external to the economic 
system of industrial modernity, but rather an integral part of that system. In this system, 
success is the ability to pass on as many “costs” as possible to others, while exploiting all 
possibilities for gain at others’ expense. As Kapp (1965; 1969; 1970; 1971; 1978 [1963]) 
pointed out long ago, this is an exercise in cost shifting,2 and the output of a firm is dependent 
                                                     
2 As Kapp (1965: 1) stated: “The concept of social costs refers to a wide variety of harmful effects of 
productive activities which are not reflected in entrepreneurial cost accounts and, hence, tend to be 
neglected in private decision making. That is to say, social costs may be identified as those harmful 
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on its ability to shift part of its costs to other sectors of the economy or individuals. Cost 
shifting can be identified within the structure of the economic system made operational 
through the mechanism of market competition. While unable to recognise structure, 
neoclassical economists might have recognised that investment for profit does not entail 
social efficiency, anymore than does the individual aiming to maximise their utility. 
Consistent with their neoclassically designated roles, both the primary mainstream economic 
actors – firms and consumers – can act “optimally” by shifting costs onto others. On this 
basis, mainstream economics should regard environmental degradation, as well as other social 
costs, as endemic to the system, and not some minor aberration or instance of market failure 
to be fixed by adjusting a price at the margin (i.e. internalising externalities). Yet, they persist 
in their ideological commitment to “getting the prices right” to empower economic actors 
with “information” about how to allocate resources efficiently. 
Attempts, supposedly justified by “new” welfare economics, to convert environmental 
degradation into social costs, estimated as monetary values, require the application of heroic 
assumptions, e.g., a monistic value theory with total and universal commensurability, 
utilitarian ethics, absence of lexicographic preferences. The Pareto criterion, which 
economists seem to assume is some uncontestable moral ethic, justifies making the rich richer 
while doing nothing for anyone else. Its Kaldor-Hicks adjustment means deliberate harm – 
even to the already worst-off – can be justified without any actual compensation. The 
application of cost-benefit analysis to global environmental change (e.g. enhanced greenhouse 
effect causing climate change) violates even this neoclassically-based welfare theory, not least 
by ignoring the requirements for maintaining money as a measuring rod of value (i.e. no 
substantive income changes). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
effects of private action which, under given conditions and institutional arrangements, tend to be 
shifted to and borne by other sectors, third persons, or the economy as a whole.” 
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After decades of criticism the arbitrary and unscientific economic analysis of 
environmental problems as “externalities” remains firmly in place. Worse still, the application 
of cost-benefit analysis to climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions has earned one 
economist, Stern, a place in the House of Lords, and another, Nordhaus, the highest 
international prize in economics. This despite Stern and his colleagues’ work not addressing 
the basic issues they themselves identify (Spash 2007a; 2014). In the case of Nordhaus he has 
persisted in producing numbers which even The Economist admitted were “massively 
simplified” (Spash 2002a: 161), and he has always employed not only over-simplification but 
also numerous ad hoc assumptions and highly selective use of science, possible future 
impacts and economic scenarios (Spash 2002b; 2007b). 
Beyond the basic failures of mainstream economists, even to stay within the strictures of 
their own theories, there is a much larger failure of the economics profession in general, and 
that is a lack of relation to the natural world. Most economists are trained to ignore the 
existence of anything outside “the economy”, as if this were a self-sustaining and singular 
type of system. In what follows, we will explain why there is no such isolated system as “the 
economy”, nor any such universal type as “the economy”, but only varieties of economies. 
 
III. Relations between economy, society and nature: ontology 
The basic relationship of an economy to the rest of reality is core to understanding the 
ecological crisis of modernity. Economics, in both orthodoxy and heterodoxy, largely fails to 
include the dependency of human society on nature. In the orthodoxy, resource and 
environmental economics uses neoclassical microeconomics and welfare theory, but is a 
marginalised and minor field within the economics profession. In the heterodoxy, outside of 
social ecological economics, there has been minimal attention to the environment: mainly 
amongst eco-socialists and eco-feminists, occasionally by institutionalists, and to a much 
lesser extent by a few post-Keynesians (Spash and Ryan 2012). In general, economists treat 
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the environment as an optional extra, an area for specialists, outside the central concerns of 
the profession, rather than of fundamental importance to understanding economic systems, 
their organisation, operation and reproduction. 
The reality is that the modern economy is built on fossil fuels and mass throughput of 
low entropy resources. The standard picture of what constitutes “the economy” is narrowly 
framed around price-making markets and capital accumulation. There is no connection 
between the macroeconomic circular flow diagram, with its never ending cycle of goods and 
services flowing between firms and households, and the necessary resource inputs and waste 
outputs that make this system operative. If there were, the fallacy of such a model would be 
self-evident. As every military strategist knows, if you cut the resource supplies the economy 
soon collapses. Just as crucial, humans can die from accumulation of waste including their 
own excrement (a problem related to typhoid and hepatitis, documented for millions living in 
cities by Davis 2006 pp.137-142 in a section entitled ‘living in shit’ in a chapter on ‘Slum 
Ecology’). However, material provisioning and waste disposal have no place in modern 
economics where “the economy” is treated as a physically isolated system (i.e., with no 
material or energy exchange with any other system). Once this theoretical pretence is 
dropped, specifying the nature of the relationship of different types of economy to the 
environment becomes key. 
That there are different types of economy is also something typically ignored by 
economists. Commonly the issue is to determine how “the economy” operates and what the 
relationships of “the economy” are that would maintain certain states (e.g. full employment, 
growth). That there are varieties of economic systems seems self-evident due to the potential 
variety of institutional arrangements for operating social provisioning systems, e.g. the extent 
of state planning, corporate control, ownership of the means of production, types of property 
rights, types of markets or no markets. Indeed, exactly what factors can vary across 
economies is contested. For example, a common neoliberal claim is that “free” market 
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capitalism is the ultimate form of economy and the only way in which human societies, on the 
scale of the current population, can operate. Others contest that government intervention is 
essential. That there might be varieties of capitalism is one issue (e.g., Hall and Gingerich 
2009; Hall and Thelen 2008). That there might be alternatives to capitalism has seemingly 
been pushed off most economists’ research agendas. Yet this is a basic historical fact. That is, 
before capitalism there were other types of economic systems, other economies. Once both 
the possibility of and need for alternatives are accepted then questions arise as to the varieties 
of social structure, means of social provisioning and waste disposal, and relationships with 
nature and biophysical reality. 
In general, the conceptualisation of the place of economies in relation to other structures 
is a matter of ontology. Clarifying the structural relationships and dependency amongst 
different structures has then been a matter of some debate (e.g. the social ‘embeddedness’ of 
the economy, see Dale 2010; Gemici 2008). For those who have been attentive to the 
relationship between the economy and society, a popular interpretation of the rise of market 
capitalism is that “the economy” has taken over society. For example, Sachs (2015 [1999]: 
17) states that “the economy overshadows every other reality; the laws of economy dominate 
society and not the rules of society the economy”. This line of reasoning can be traced back to 
Karl Polanyi and his ideas of the economy being embedded in society prior to capitalism 
(Polanyi 1977b), and then the society becoming embedded in the market economy after its 
rise to power (e.g., Polanyi 1977a: 9). However, such reasoning is contradictory and 
problematic because, as Polanyi recognises, no economy can exist without society and the 
form of an economy is emergent from and dependent upon social relationships. There are then 
no pure economic entities that can dominate the social, but rather different types of social 
economic relations. Market economies are still “embedded” in social relations, but they rely 
on very specific institutionalised forms. 
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What the emergence of economies from society emphasises is the necessity of social 
theory. That is, economics always entails a set of social understandings whether they are 
explicit or not. Economic policy recommendations that fail to pay any attention to social 
aspects are like planning a transport system by designing a car engine (Spash 2017). Social 
relationships in the market economy are atomised to the individual, although this is 
contradicted by the necessity of non-market coordinating institutions (conventions, norms, 
rules and regulations, see Vatn 2005) that make the market operational. In addition, the 
undermining of social relationships in market-based economies results in the necessity of 
government intervention to restabilise the systems and save capitalism from itself. This is 
Polanyi’s “double movement”. The need to give back to the exploited before chaos ensues or 
democracy becomes authoritarian, dictatorial and fascist. 
The tendency to undermine the social relationships upon which the system depends is 
matched by the impact on the environment. Ecosystems functions and structure are not 
optional extras to be added as an afterthought. The quality of the environment is essential to 
human flourishing and survival. Humans are biological entities and as such need to maintain 
their metabolism and are subject to the needs and conditions – climate, temperature, nutrients, 
water, oxygen – of being such entities. The ability to create interventions that change the 
actualised environmental circumstances to human advantage does not change these structural 
limits, but rather works within them, e.g. houses maintain a certain necessary temperature. 
This is a major distinction that needs to be made clear because of the techno-optimist rhetoric 
that claims human imagination can achieve anything it conceives; something prevalent 
amongst a class of technocratic advocates of the controversial Anthropocene 
conceptualisation of social ecological crises (Baskin 2015). 
In this respect, a critical realist philosophy of science can help due to its depth ontology 
and understanding of stratification and emergence (see Collier 1994). The depth ontology 
differentiates between the empirical (things sensed by humans) and actual (things that happen, 
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not all which we sense), but also emphasises the role of an underlying structural aspect of 
reality. The relationship between, for example, the social, biological, chemical and physical is 
stratified and hierarchically ordered. Each stratum has its own causal mechanisms. What this 
philosophy of science explains is the asymmetric dependency of one set of mechanisms on 
another, but not in a reductionist or determinist sense. Higher strata have the properties of 
emergence, so they cannot be understood by reduction to the lower strata on which they 
depend, e.g. humans cannot be fully understood by reduction to the rules governing their 
biology. The structure of the natural world is slow to change or effectively (as far as humans 
are concerned) unchanging. Science has progressed by learning the rules, understanding the 
mechanisms of physics, chemistry and biology, and then technology has been developed by 
using these mechanisms for human ends. 
The reason humanity faces limits is because it does not make the rules. However, in 
creating actual events and phenomena different mechanisms, from across the layers of nature, 
can be, and typically are, brought together. Thus, understanding concrete events and 
phenomena requires knowledge of the multiple mechanisms that cause them. Human 
economic and social systems impact on ecosystems, species, biological and physical entities, 
not by changing the mechanisms, but by using them, either intentionally or unintentionally. 
Of course, a class of humans now have the ability to destroy entire systems on Earth, which 
completely removes mechanisms and their potential. 
So how should something like human induced climate change be understood from this 
perspective? The greenhouse effect is a phenomenon established by a set of physical and 
chemical mechanisms. A select minority of humanity have unintentionally used these 
mechanisms to such an extent that they are responsible for enhancing the greenhouse effect, 
leading to global warming in the absence of any counter-mechanisms. Geoengineering 
promises to develop the use of such counter-mechanisms, rather than stop using those of the 
greenhouse effect. However, why does this minority of humans use the greenhouse 
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mechanisms on such a scale in the first place? This is because they live within fossil fuel 
based economies, and to stop using them would require changing the economic system. There 
has never been an industrial economy that was not based on fossil fuels. So a totally new type 
of economy is necessary, and because economies are dependent on social structure that would 
imply new social arrangements and new means of social provisioning. Thus, recognising 
human induced climate change as a serious structural problem, the preference of policy 
makers, corporations, industrialists, financiers, bankers and all those invested heavily in the 
fossil fuel economy is to maintain the system and hope for a technology that could provide a 
physical-chemical counter-mechanism. Yet, the enhancement of the greenhouse effect is just 
one of many ecological problems created by modern economies. 
 
IV. Linking economics to biophysical reality: ecosystems, entropy and values 
In the 1970s, fundamental insights arose from ecology about modern human society and the 
operations of its economy under capital accumulation and mass consumerism. At the core of 
concerns was the disruption of ecosystems’ structure and functions impacting on human and 
non-human life. Impacts were related to the expanding scale of human activity due to 
economic and population growth (e.g. land use change, appropriation of natural functions), 
technologically driven qualities of those activities (e.g., emissions from fossil fuels, 
radioactive waste from nuclear power, toxic waste from the creation of synthetic chemical 
substances), and their combined impact. 
The interconnectivity of things was a major new understanding coming from ecology, 
based upon the developing concept of ecosystems. Nutrients, as essential to life, were linked 
to chemical cycles – carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus and Sulphur – operating 
through ecosystems. As systems composed of physical-chemical-biological processes, 
ecosystems were recognised to provide a concept of the functioning of nature that combined 
the biotic and abiotic. The importance of the conversion of biomass into energy laid the 
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foundations for studying ecosystems through energy flow analysis. For example, ecologists 
traced energy through agro-ecosystems to question the sustainability of the Green revolution 
in agriculture (Biswas and Biswas 1976; Pimentel, et al. 1973). Pollution had been treated as a 
local problem or something solved by dilution of matter into a large and accepting 
environment. Now the long range transport of air pollutants creating acidic deposition became 
a recognised phenomenon, as did the potential for bioaccumulation of chemicals (e.g. DDT, 
heavy metals). In all this new understanding, the centrality of ecosystems structure and 
functioning to life on planet Earth became evident, but also that the characteristics of 
ecosystems were not those of mechanistic science, i.e. stable, static, equilibrating, reversible. 
 
Ecosystems Change, Irreversibility and Strong Uncertainty 
For a long time ecologists assumed ecosystems were largely closed systems dominated by 
internal recycling of elements, self-regulating and deterministic, and stable with end points 
(e.g., climax communities). They also neglected human influence, externalised it and 
separated it off, as something outside their concerns. Holling (2009 [1986]: 87; 1995) 
reinterpreted disturbance as part of ecosystem dynamics and described this as a cycle in four 
phases: (i) exploitation, where species get established; (ii) conservation, where a climax 
community is achieved and consolidated; (iii) release / creative destruction, where a 
disturbance destroys the structure; and (iv) reorganisation / renewal, where order and structure 
starts to reform incorporating released materials and energy. An ecosystem might 
dramatically change at stage (iii), thereby preventing reorganisation along the same path as 
before. That is, there is no guarantee that a system will keep going through the same cycle of 
succession and recreating the same structure and functions (e.g. an old growth forest might 
never reappear after a devastating forest fire, and instead might become a desert ecosystem). 
The resilience of a system is then defined in terms of maintaining certain structures and 
functions through change. This emphasises the boundary of stability, events far from 
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equilibrium, high variability and adaptation to change (Holling 2009 [1986]: 71-71). 
Economic growth emphasises “operational efficiency” and demands more from all systems 
leading to impacts on biophysical evolution (Holling 2009 [1986]: 92). 
These developments in ecosystem theory led to awareness that the changing dynamic of 
systems may result in surprise as systems flip due to different attractors becoming dominant. 
Kay et al. (1999) developed the concept of a self-organising holarchic open system. Such a 
system shows spontaneous coherent behaviour but can suddenly change (i.e., show 
discontinuity) when reaching a “catastrophic” threshold. Learning from ecosystems dynamics 
is combined with thermodynamic theory and linked into the need for a new approach to 
science. The scientist is seen as providing narrative descriptions, based upon quantitative and 
qualitative understanding, rather than making deterministic predictions. Kay et al. (1994: 737-
740) recommend a process of management where science informs but decisions involve 
ethics, values and concerns, visions of the future and socio-political context. 
Continuous human intervention creating disturbance to ecosystems structure and 
functioning is not some mechanistic engineering problem to be solved through controlled 
experimentation. Standard scientific epistemology is challenged due to complexity precluding 
reductionism, lack of control and inability to replicate relationships in open systems. “Not 
only is the science incomplete, the system itself is a moving target, evolving because of the 
impacts of management and the progressive expansion of the scale of human influences on 
the planet” (Walters and Holling 2009 [1990]: 117-118). Ludwig, Hilborn and Walters (1993) 
note the failure of science to prevent resource overexploitation, collapse and extinction and 
see this as due to a lack of scientific consensus as to the causes. The recommendation is 
caution and, more specifically, attention to: human motivation, acting before scientific 
consensus, recognising scientists and their judgements are subject to political pressure, 
distrusting claims of sustainability (especially where problems of population growth and 
excessive resource use are ignored), and confronting uncertainty. Similar concerns lay behind 
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the development of post-normal science and its recommendation to involve an extended peer 
community in science-policy, including laypersons (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991). 
As can be seen from this brief overview, the literature on ecosystem dynamics 
emphasises surprise and strong uncertainty (i.e., ignorance and indeterminacy, see Spash 
2002c). However, economics remains mechanistic, quantitative, equilibrium seeking and so 
totally incompatible with understanding the reality of the ecosystems in which economies are 
embedded. As Holling et al. (1995) recognise, the result is that economists generally ignore 
ecological information, despite the accumulated body of evidence from natural, disturbed and 
managed ecosystems. 
Rather than a more humble approach in human non-human relationships, the co-option 
of selected ecological concepts has been employed to support the opposite conclusion, that 
humans can create and control everything. For example, the idea that resilience is something 
mechanistic to be built into all systems as an inherently good quality, despite there being 
nothing that necessitates resilience in itself leading to sustainability, and it may even do the 
opposite, e.g. a resilient fossil fuel economy hurtling us headlong towards climatic disaster. 
Similarly, the use made of the ecological concept of adaptation can be seen as having 
undermined greenhouse gas mitigation especially once combined with economistic arguments 
about adaptation being more “cost-effective”. The inappropriateness of such human hubris is 
further reinforced by the laws of physics. 
 
Thermodynamics, Entropy and Economics 
The marginalist revolution in economics during the 1870s, which led to the rise of 
neoclassical economics, borrowed heavily from mechanistic physics in terms of mathematical 
formalism and models (Mirowski 1989). However, economics has managed to totally ignore 
the relevance of actual laws of physics, despite their importance for the social provisioning 
and reproduction of society. Economic growth predicated on material throughput creates vast 
16 
 
amounts of waste. These wastes go into the environment and ecosystems with the implicit 
expectation of their harmless assimilation. The amount of energy remains the same from 
extraction to waste, as a direct consequence of the First Law of Thermodynamics, i.e. energy 
can neither be created nor destroyed. A similar law relates to matter and led to the idea of 
materials balance theory, that was briefly a topic of research in environmental economics 
(Kneese, et al. 1970), that later developed into the field of industrial ecology. This means 
material that does not go into embodied capital will become waste and all the materials 
extracted from the environment will go back into the environment in equal mass. 
Economic growth is dependent upon a specific form of energy, that is energy available 
for performing mechanical, chemical or thermal work. This useful energy is termed “exergy” 
to differentiate it from energy, which is neither created nor destroyed, because exergy is used 
up in all transformation processes (Ayres and Warr 2009). Modern industrial society makes 
use of stored exergy in ores and fossil fuels. These sources are depleted and while the energy 
remains in the system it is no longer useful and so the exergy is reduced. The Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, or Entropy Law, in its classic form, states that energy changes quality from 
useful (low entropy) to less useful (high entropy) heading towards an equilibrium where all is 
evenly distributed (heat death of the universe). This process is irreversible and therefore 
associated with the phrase “times arrow”. Creating concentrated forms of matter and energy 
(i.e., low entropy) is possible within a system, but only with energy added from another 
system; that is, overall in the combined system energy is still degraded, the Entropy Law 
remains in force. Georgescu-Roegen’s (1971) major thesis, “The Entropy Law and the 
Economic Process”, basically concluded that economic growth was infeasible over the long 
run and economic policy needed fundamental reform. His reasoning led to questioning human 
society from the size of population and the pressure placed upon systems, to the time allowed 
for change and the rate at which human systems impose change. Economic systems are then 
inseparable from ethical judgments both concerning others currently living and future 
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generations. Herman Daly (1977a; 1977b) came to the conclusion that the best option in the 
face of the Entropy Law and critiques of growth was to aim for a steady-state economy. 
The Entropy Law has been taken to imply absolute constraints on economic systems 
(Daly 1977a; 1977b; Georgescu-Roegen 2009 [1975]). That is, energy use depletes stored 
exergy and dissipates minerals into “devil’s dust” which can never be recovered (Marx cited 
by Daly 1968). However, in theory the large amounts of energy input to the Earth system 
from the Sun can be used to create order and reverse dispersal. If human society relied upon 
solar energy and conserved the required amounts of ores to maintain man-made capital then a 
different type of economic system could be sustained over a long time horizon (Ayres 1998). 
In fact, humans are not anywhere near meeting such requirements for a physically-sustainable 
system. We have no machines for filtering atomic particles from the atmosphere or oceans for 
reconstruction to replace essential ores, let alone ones which can do so while replacing all the 
materials they dissipate in the process and as they themselves decay. So in practice dissipation 
of ores and running down of useful energy sources (exergy), while creating all-pervasive 
pollution, are major problems posing ultimate limits. Indeed the rush to use these sources 
means the transition to a world which is of the physically sustainable type will be thrust upon 
future generations rather than achieved via a planned process. The great hope of the 
mainstream economic tradition is that prices will send signals to which producers will respond 
with substitution away from the increasingly unavailable resources. Yet, such economics is 
based on mechanistic equilibrium theories which bare little relationship to reality and cannot 
explain the evolution of technological change. Why mainstream economists, who have no 
theory to address past transitions, should predict a smooth future transition in the face of 
resource and exergy depletion, appears explicable more as a matter of blind faith than 
economic science. 
In the absence of the means to re-concentrate dispersed ores a prudent approach would 
be to avoid their frivolous use. Of course what is frivolous, and whether a minority of humans 
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should have a big all-consuming party while others starve, are value judgments of a most 
fundamental kind, not dictates from physical laws. Georgescu-Roegen (2009 [1975]) 
extrapolated from his interpretation of classical entropy as to the desirability of degrowth and 
avoiding luxury items constituted of metals which future generations would need for basic 
food production. Clearly physical laws only point to implications, they do not make ethical 
choices for us. Similarly the size of human population, type and scale of pressures placed 
upon systems, time allowed for change and rate of imposed change, are all matters for human 
judgment (if those responsible were able to stand back and use some). 
One caveat to classical entropy is the neglect of self-organising systems arising to make 
use of available energy, i.e. organisation from disorder (Schneider and Kay 1994). These 
systems include ecosystem functions but also geo-physical systems, such as climate 
regulation and ocean current circulation. Unfortunately some humans are destroying the 
ability of existing self-organising systems to operate. In addition, these systems fall outside 
the economic model of what is valued because they are not exchanged in market transactions. 
Ayres (1998; 2004) proposes starting to take account of what we are doing using measures of 
exergy, and others have suggested similar energy based approaches to measuring ecosystem 
health (Schneider and Kay 1994). 
 
Ecosystems’ Function, Structure and Value 
The idea of stable equilibria is a fallacy. At the ecosystem level change is an ongoing reality 
and always has been, but human induced change is qualitatively and quantitatively different. 
Landscape modification, climate change and/or social developments all disturb ecosystem 
structure and function. The five main direct causes of biodiversity loss and degradation of 
ecosystems are: land use change, pollution, climate change, resource depletion and invasive 
alien species. All these factors are structurally part of current industrial economic systems 
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with their focus on capital accumulation, appropriation of resources, global trade and 
innovative technology. 
That humans are changing ecosystems is not in question, contestation is over the extent 
of human control, potential irreversibility and surprise, and consequences both bio-physically 
and in social, psychological and value terms. The idea that humans can recreate and restore 
ecosystems to their historical form (e.g. by invasive species removal) is popular enough. 
However, human inability and ignorance, plus the characteristics of the Holling cycle, imply 
that the outcomes are more likely to be novel ecosystems that are different from and cannot be 
restored to historic ones. Novel ecosystems may also arise from planned creation which can 
take on a variety of forms. For example, farming involves controlling non-human nature to 
establish specific ecological functions for human productivist ends. More recently the idea of 
promoting specific, typically singular, functions has moved to the planetary level as a means 
for survival e.g., carbon sequestration. Novel ecosystems may also arise from maintaining 
specific species or aesthetics because other aspects are simply ignored, and hence a new 
structure results. Then there is the whole area of compensation for loss, where totally different 
ecosystems, often in different locations, are created to justify destruction elsewhere. 
How ecosystems functions are conceptualised and valued becomes a core concern. 
Regarding ecosystems as service providers facilitates regarding all change as good, because 
novelty can be described as supplying new ecosystem services. The central issue is how 
commensurable are new and old. The use of arguments to justify ecosystem destruction and 
re-creation is pervasive in the development of economic instruments for offsetting 
deliberately created damages, such as emissions trading (Spash 2010), biodiversity offsetting 
(Spash 2015), and species and ecosystem banking (Spash 2011). Corporations and their 
financial backers, engaged internationally in resource extraction, have been particularly keen 
on seeing an “anything goes” policy, justified by commensuration of loss and gain. This has 
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been supported by arguments that the worth of ecosystems can be converted into monetary 
values based on individual preferences (Spash 2008). 
An alternative is to focus explicitly on ecosystems functions, but this does not avoid 
commensuration and value judgements. A particular problem is where functional goals take 
priority over historical and compositional ones in ecosystem management. The contention is 
that ecosystem functions should be changed in novel ways to meet ecological crises, and 
traditional preservation goals should be dropped because they will prevent adaptation. Such 
logic is found in promotion of the bioeconomy, mainstream climate change mitigation and 
geoengineering. Desjardins, Donhauser and Barker (2019) identify a mechanistic approach to 
natural processes in such policy proposals, which also adopt a central aim of maintaining 
economic growth and industrial “development”. Instead they argue for ecological integrity 
and value of place assessed through complex, multi-dimensional indices, rather than simple 
proxies. Such complex multidimensional evaluation severely restricts commensurability and 
means directly opposing economic and business logic based on bulldozing biodiversity and 
erasing ecosystems for monetary gain. 
What cannot be avoided is the role of values and judgement. The aims of maintaining 
historical continuity, social-ecological relationships and a place for non-human autonomy sit 
uneasily with the values and institutions of price-making markets, love of money and capital 
accumulation. Contention over the values of modernity have always been evident when it 
comes to environmental concerns, and attempts to remove values for hegemonic conformity 
merely create the contradictions of new environmental pragmatism in the modern 
environmental movement (Spash 2009). A place for “other values” is evident in the 
“rewilding” movement that includes a radical non-anthropocentric stance aimed at giving 
back autonomy to non-human nature (Gammon 2018). This demands a reinterpretation of 
landscape and history, as well as the relations between humans and their environment, and 
thus challenges identities that are historically based (Drenthen 2018). 
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Values are constitutive of human identity and reproduced (or not) through human 
practice. There are then real conflicts between the values of modernity promoted by 
industrialised technologically driven economies and other types of economies. Technology 
has become a force in itself that forecloses any notion of ends that would challenge what 
technology itself favours. As a hegemonic discourse it has real impacts on the world, 
motivating practices that eradicate human-independent entities from the surface of the Earth 
(Vetlesen, 2015, pp. 161–162). 
Humans hold plural values that are in regular conflict. If economist wish to have any 
scientific credibility they can no longer continue the pretence that humans are preference 
utilitarians, or even purely consequentialists. In addition, the pretence that their work and its 
conceptualisations have no value implications and are merely factual, in some naïve 
objectivist sense, needs to be dropped as equally fallacious. 
 
V. What type of economics and what type of economy? 
That the global economy needs to change to avoid social ecological collapse, poses the 
problem of how and what sort of economics might help? There are three interrelated research 
questions. First, what is understood as being the current social ecological and economic 
reality and the causal mechanisms creating crises? Second, how can the current system be 
transformed, i.e. what are the barriers and enablers? Third, what is the goal of transformation, 
i.e. what kind of society is desirable? 
What then is the point of the growth economy that modern economics tries so hard to 
sustain? Keynes advocated growth to avoid imminent social and economic collapse leading to 
international instability and war due to high unemployment (Spash and Schandl 2009). 
Keynes (1930) outlined his vision in an article entitled “Economic possibilities for our 
grandchildren”. He defined the economic problem as removing the struggle for meeting 
subsistence needs, a definable goal with an endpoint. His means of transformation was 100 
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years of economic growth (not an end in itself). Keynesians remain apologists for capitalism 
and the growth economy, although often growth for them this seems to have become an 
objective not a means. The ecological economist Tim Jackson (2009), as noted earlier, argues 
in line with Keynes, requiring the growth economy to transform society before there can be 
“prosperity without growth”. 
For Keynes the future goal was a leisure society sustained by the accumulated capital 
(ignoring maintenance requirements). Although he had doubts about this utopia when looking 
at the leisure class of his contemporaries. Worse, he recognised his transformative economic 
growth society would require empowering the worst of human values (i.e., greed, avarice, 
usury, the desire for ever more money) and people (i.e., those with “semi-criminal, semi-
pathological propensities”). He had absolutely no answer as to what could be done after 100 
years had been spent pretending “that fair is foul and foul is fair; for foul is useful and fair is 
not” (Keynes 1930: 97). Under neoliberalism, the values Keynes apparently despised so much 
have been made into norms, supported by the institutions of private and public enterprise. 
Concepts of “sufficiency” and “the good life for all” are challenges to how economic 
systems have been developing under Keynes growth imperative. Keynes recognised that 
affluence would not inform how “the art of life itself” should be conducted. Productivism 
makes life into labouring for a wage to survive and love of money into a virtue. While love of 
money results in people “which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists of mental 
disease” (Keynes, 1930, p. 97). Today, these are some of the most powerful people in the 
world. 
The Polanyian double movement summarises the same tension between protecting and 
reacting against market capitalism (Polanyi 1944 e.g., Chapter 11). Keynesian policy faces the 
dilemma of promoting this system, while also requiring major government intervention to 
control boom-bust cycles, and criticising and removing “market incentives” in the form of 
unemployment and bankruptcy. The welfare state was a necessary reaction to the social 
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effects of unregulated market capitalism of the 19th Century and, more generally, the 
commodification of labour (Burawoy, 2015). Its gradual deconstruction by neoliberalism has 
led to a situation similar to the social and economic crises of the 1920s and 1930s, including 
the political encouragement of nationalism and fascism. So unsurprisingly, returns to the 
Keynesian policies of the “golden age” (1950 to 1973) are back on the agenda, but with the 
additional aim of trying to address the ecological crises. A currently prominent example is the 
Green New Deal. Principally the target is carbon emissions and the concern is how to finance 
policy initiatives while creating growth, jobs and more equality. Changing the conditions 
under which capitalism operates is what has made it resilient in the face of change, and this 
may be part of developing a future regulatory regime (Dannreuther and Petit 2012). However, 
this plan for a new, Green, fully employed, productivist, capitalist, growth economy considers 
none of the causal mechanism that generate lifestyles of unsustainable consumption and 
involves no analysis of the structure of material and energy throughput of the existing or 
revamped capitalist system. Rather than the necessary radical change, a Gramscian “passive 
revolution” is offered, which reinforces and facilities the preservation of the hegemonic 
system. 
Even those who strongly criticise growth can be found defending market capitalism. A 
prime example is the steady-state economy promoted by Herman Daly (1973; 1992). This 
recommends a monetary, price-making market, capitalist economy that operates in 
equilibrium at an “optimal” scale to stay within limits to avoid ecological disaster. Scale, 
while important, fails to address the issues highlighted in our coverage of ecosystems or the 
qualitative properties of pollutants (e.g. toxic waste, radiation, plastics, hormones). Social 
problems are limited to inequitable income distribution which fails to get to the heart of the 
social organisation of production. Most fundamentally there remains the contradiction of 
maintaining the social economic institutions of capital-accumulation while deconstructing 
economic growth. Indeed, in reply to the criticisms of Smith (2010), Daly (2010) has 
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confirmed his preference for constrained markets over centralised planning with the aim of 
achieving allocative efficiency. He has long been an advocate for tradable permits markets, 
even for the allocation of rights to give birth (Daly 1974). His apologia for capitalism is why 
some see the steady state as a Trojan horse for neoclassical economic thinking (Pirgmaier 
2017). Others believe they can adopt Daly as a mainstream economist (Auffhammer 2009), 
which would clearly be difficult (Spash 2013). However, there is much confusion as to what 
an alternative economics is all about with the two main ecological economics textbooks – 
(Common and Stagl 2005; Daly and Farley 2004) – both strongly supporting the basic validity 
of neoclassical economics. 
The point of these critical reflections is that the structural and multiple causal 
mechanisms creating social ecological crises are not being addressed and cannot be addressed 
by neoclassical economics anymore than maintaining market capitalism will solve our 
problems. The major contribution of Daly, like his teacher Georgescu-Roegen, has been to 
emphasise the importance of biophysical reality for the operations of any economy. However, 
the move away from “growth=development”, “growth removes poverty”, “growth is 
necessary”, and towards an economy without growth, requires more than income 
redistribution and limits on scale. Neither is this a simple matter of implementing market 
based policies or subsidising corporate development of Green technology. The core is how 
social provisioning is undertaken, within which institutional arrangements and for what ends. 
In order to answer these questions, requires a research agenda that understands the 
social metabolism of an economy (see Gerber and Scheidel 2018; Giampietro, et al. 2009; 
Krausmann 2017). That is, in the same way that the biological metabolism of a human 
necessarily needs inputs and outputs to maintain itself, so does society. Yet, society can be 
structured in different ways with different material and energy requirements. Prioritising 
reductions in material and energy throughput to sustain systems over a long time period 
means using simpler technologies and less automatised production systems that can be 
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maintained by the users with readily available materials and without complex technical 
knowledge, i.e., appropriate technologies. The problem with Green economies, Green New 
Deals and Green revolutions is that they pay no attention to the structural relationships nor the 
requirements of the associated technologies, let alone the military interventions that maintain 
their supply chains. However, there is more to the structure of society than materials and 
energy. There are the values a society upholds and, through its practices, reproduces. 
This is why there is no such thing as a value-neutral technology. The transformation of 
social practices by technology is clear to anyone who looks around them, from modes of 
transport to means of communication to work life. Technology additionally brings with it 
strong uncertainty (ignorance and indeterminacy), surprise, lock-in and social change. The 
values it entails relate not just to human relationships but also human to non-human and, in 
modernity the most neglected of all, non-human to non-human relationships. Technology is 
inherently anthropocentric and typically about human dominance over nature. Yet the rhetoric 
surrounding technology, innovation and growth is a better world for all. 
The “Green revolution” in the 1960s, and the later push to use biotechnology and 
genetically modified organisms in food production, were undertaken in the name of “feeding 
the world”. Yet, as Sen (1986) explained, famines have not occurred due to lack of food but 
due to lack of ability to pay, or actually pay high enough, in a monetary system of profit 
making. More commodification of nature, price-making markets, technology and capitalist 
growth do nothing to address this systemic problem, rather the exact opposite. A basic fact is 
that the number of undernourished people has remained at approximately 800 million since 
the mid-1990s (FAO 1996; FIAN 2018), although food production has been high enough to 
feed the whole world. The aim of sufficient food to feed the world is fundamentally at odds 
with the current systems that create excess and waste for profit, while others starve. From 
Western obesity to third world starvation, no one gets a good life. 
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Economics, to be of use for the future, must address how to meet basic needs through 
social provisioning, not how to create markets for profit making. Billions suffer deprivation of 
food, water, shelter and sanitation. The variety of economies that might operate to address 
these issues is not even on the research agenda. Instead a one-size-fits-all approach is backed 
by simple quantitative minimum standards that reduce the human condition to a common 
metric that ignores culture and meaning (Sachs 2015 [1999]: 9-10). In contrast, needs can be 
associated with contextual satisfiers that are culturally specific and signify the diversity and 
difference that gives meaning to people’s lives (Rauschmayer and Omann 2017). At the same 
time, that needs can be met by different satisfiers allows analysis and creation of alternative 
economies for social provisioning. 
 
VI. Concluding remarks 
To suggest ways out of the current social ecological crisis, we need an economics that can 
lead us away from catastrophe rather than towards it. Such an economics needs to understand 
both how the current economy is working and impacting on ecosystems, how ecosystems 
work and the basic structural mechanisms of the natural world, as well as understanding 
potentials that could be built on to create new and different kinds of economic systems. 
Current projects of Green growth or a Green New Deal, unfortunately, do not live up to these 
criteria because they fail to conceptualise nature and environmental problems in their own 
terms. 
John Stuart Mill believed that economics, as political economy, needed to be more than 
abstract theory and should be practical. In order to achieve that end, and contrary to the later 
development of economics, his Principles  
“treated Political Economy not as a thing by itself, but as a fragment of a 
greater whole; a branch of Social Philosophy, so interlinked with all the other 
branches, that its conclusions, even in its own peculiar province, are only true 
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conditionally, subject to interference and counteraction from causes not 
directly within its scope: while to the character of a practical guide it has no 
pretension, apart from other classes of considerations” (Mill 1874: 236).  
More than being this sort of interdisciplinary social science, we argue for economics to also 
connect to the natural sciences in order to understand the basic requirements for social 
provisioning and the reproduction of society. 
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